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Anger, Gender, Race, and the  





Individuals’ mental states are relevant to many processes in America’s 
legal system, from finding parties had consciousness of guilt to determining 
damages for tort victims’ pain and suffering.  Under the First Amendment, 
emotions are taken into consideration for assessing the boundaries of free 
speech rights. Among the essential emotions affecting analyses of free 
speech rights—and limitations—is anger.  This essay examines how First 
Amendment jurisprudence grapples with anger in two free speech contexts: 
the “fighting words” doctrine under Chaplinsky and the “incitement” 
doctrine under Brandenburg.  The analysis finds a baseline definition of 
anger that is subtly, yet importantly, gendered and racialized. For the 
“dormant” Chaplinsky doctrine, troubling questions of systematic bias may 
be limited; however, anger’s conceptualization produces more-serious 
concerns under Brandenburg.  It concludes with recommendations for 
constitutional law scholars and practitioners working to vindicate broader 




Like other areas of American law and jurisprudence, free speech rights 
under the First Amendment use emotions as essential indicia in analyses of 
claims, including those concerning individual rights. Anger is understood 
to affect individuals in a particularly powerful way. Typically, American 
constitutional law understands it as a combination of instinctual and 
cognitive-rationalist sensations at the individual level, reflecting 
perspectives from Roman Stoic Seneca to the modern works of Martha 
Nussbaum. In this generalized view, people may experience anger when 
engaged in speaking or listening—and often will experience it in the 
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contentious debates of modern society—but can manage to curb most 
impulses to lash out (i.e., violently), at least most of the time.  
Yet, First Amendment jurisprudence permits some exceptions to the 
broad sweep of free speech rights at least in part with anger in mind. Two 
of these doctrines hold that certain speech does not receive protection under 
the First Amendment: situations where the speech is so patently offensive 
as to constitute “fighting words,” i.e., statements likely to induce a listener 
to move to censure the speaker; and situations where the speech is meant 
to and likely will incite listeners to heed a call to join the speaker, i.e., 
statements intended to command others to engage in “imminent lawless 
action.” These scenarios correspond to doctrines established in the 
landmark cases of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
respectively. Both doctrines recognize the potential for anger to override 
rationality and restraint, carving out room for the state to prevent or 
terminate unprotected speech perceived as especially likely to produce 
those results.  
Per those examples, First Amendment jurisprudence echoes well 
Nussbaum and others’ work on emotions, and especially their framing of 
anger, in direct, face-to-face speech contexts. This essay challenges those 
streams of work, drawing heavily from critical legal studies (CLS), 
including feminist and critical race theorists work in U.S. constitutional 
law, to highlight the ways in which these understandings of anger are 
limited. Ultimately, these doctrines give only a partial view of anger – and 
the ways in which anger is understood and permitted to be expressed 
produce concrete inequalities. These doctrines also conflate distinct forms 
of ressentiment and resentment with anger, and free speech jurisprudence 
as a whole takes for granted an overly narrow, context-less view of 
“objective” anger. The way anger is understood, and can be expressed 
given prevailing social norms and legal tests, essentially erases individuals 
and groups (e.g., women, nonwhite and queer/LGBTQ+ people, and others) 
who face unequally distributed constraints on expressing certain emotions, 
or how they are permitted to express them, in public settings. Finally, this 
essay juxtaposes Chaplinsky’s “fighting words” doctrine with “incitement” 
under Brandenburg, which share a common conceptual framework for 
understanding anger as a politically volatile emotion, yet present distinct 
normative and strategic concerns from a CLS perspective. This essay 
concludes with a summary and discussion of these phenomena as they 
concern First Amendment scholarship and jurisprudence, providing some 
suggestions for subsequent research pushing toward achieving more-
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II. EMOTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL LIFE 
A. Martha Nussbaum’s Cognitivist Framework for Understanding 
Emotions in Political and Legal Contexts 
Emotions can be defined on various grounds: their psychological or 
environmental origins, their effects on the individual experiencing them, 
their rationality (or irrationality), and so on.1 In American legal and political 
contexts, however, Martha Nussbaum’s reconceptualization of the Stoics 
most clearly captures the idea of emotions as “forms of evaluative judgment 
that ascribe great importance to things and persons outside one’s control.”2 
In this “cognitivist” understanding, emotions are not “thoughtless natural 
energies,” but rather are tied to an object—for instance, to another person 
or to a thing, even a situation—and are felt about that object, with intention, 
i.e., because of one’s individual, subjective relationship to the referent 
object.3 At the same time, Nussbaum’s cognitivist view raises the question 
of exceptions. Reflecting on her own experience with intense grief after the 
sudden passing of her mother, for instance, Nussbaum described a 
seemingly “kinetic and affective aspect to emotion that does not look like 
a judgment or any part of it.”4 This, too, is folded into the reasoning 
capacity of the individual in question, and Nussbaum clarifies the 
simultaneity of these processes—an individual experiencing an intense 
emotional state is not “coolly” contemplating how to respond to an 
emotion-producing object-stimulus, but rather experiences the recognition 
and the internal “upheaval” altogether in one complex response.5 The 
“kinetic” and the rational judgment are linked, not competing, facets of a 
unified experience.  
Altogether, this rational-cognitivist model explains emotions as 
originating from a cogent, systematic response to some outside stimulus. 
Thus, human emotions—glee, fear, grief, rage—all flow from this general 
internal framework, irrespective of the specific situations or stimuli giving 
rise to them. For present purposes, the emotions undergirding individual 
expression, encompassed in concepts relating to free speech in U.S. 
constitutional law, often are understood in similar terms. From denouncing 
politicians and parties or mourning an electoral defeat to the passions 
 
 1. See Part II(B), infra, for an overview of the limited, legal scope considered herein. 
 2. Martha Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance 185 (2004), 
in ROBERT C. SOLOMON (ed.), THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS ON 
EMOTIONS (hereinafter “THINKING ABOUT FEELING”) (emphasis added).  
 3. Id. at 188. Nussbaum elaborates further, discussing the complexity of emotions and 
their relation to one’s valuation of an object. Id. at 276. In her chapter, Nussbaum powerfully 
begins by exploring her emotions as she raced toward her ailing mother’s bedside, only to 
arrive too late; her mother had passed briefly before Nussbaum made it. The object (her 
mother) for the author’s emotions brings her conceptualization vividly to life. Id. at 189.  
 4. Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 281.  
 5. Id. at 281–82.  
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underlying protest marchers’ shouted slogans and homemade signs, 
external actors and events may be seen as responses which combine the 
kinetic and the rational. 
B. Emotions in the Legal System: Embracing the Cognitivist View 
As Nussbaum observes, the American legal system generally embraces 
the cognitivist view sketched above.6 But law’s understanding of emotion 
adds a normative overlay, a complex of presumptions constraining judges 
and juries’ evaluations, in which, Nussbaum summarizes, “the prevailing 
attitude to emotions in general in the Anglo-American legal tradition … as 
we shall see, connects emotions closely with thought about important 
benefits and harms, and thus, as well, with prevailing social norms 
concerning what benefits and harms are rightly thought important.”7 
Hence, while one can distinguish emotions from “bodily appetites such 
as hunger and thirst,” as well as “from objectless moods, such as irritation 
and certain types of depression,”8 emotions are evaluated legally within 
social norm-based bounds: judges and juries, like all people, may consider 
another person to be “overreacting” to something, i.e., they evaluate the 
reasonableness of others’ emotional responses.9 In law, this serves a 
functional need since, absent this allowance for assessing the quality of 
individual emotional states, entire swaths of legal doctrine—like a 
defendant’s mens rea (“state of mind”) or a plaintiff’s claims for damages 
predicated on “pain and suffering”—would fall away. In fact, it would be 
difficult to imagine many modern legal doctrines without a framework for 
“appraisals of evaluative beliefs.”10 The question, however, turns to the 
appropriateness and usefulness of the present model for doing so. 
C. Seneca to SCOTUS: On Anger and Ressentiment in Life and Law 
Like other human emotions, anger has a cognitive logic and a socially 
defined set of norms surrounding it, no less in formal jurisprudence than in 
society at large.11 This modern framework has deep roots. Two millennia 
ago, Seneca described anger as “the most hideous and frenzied of all the 
emotions,” a feeling “all excitement and impulse” and “greedy for 
vengeance,” as a “brief insanity.”12 Seneca noted its ubiquity in the charges 
 
 6. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 21–2 (2004). 
 7. Id. at 22. 
 8. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 23 (emphasis added).  
 9. Id. at 31. 
 10. Id. at 34. 
 11. Id. at 32–33.  
 12. SENECA, ON ANGER 17 [Book I], in SENECA: MORAL AND POLITICAL ESSAYS (John 
M. Cooper & J.F. Procopé, eds. 1995) (hereinafter “ANGER”); see also FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 21–22, 40, 48–50 (Keith Ansell-Pearson ed. 
2007) (discussing anger, similarly, as an impulsive reaction, but noting that law developed 
on a presumption that “the criminal deserves to be punished because he could have acted 
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brought before the “law-courts” of his contemporary Rome, as well as in 
the warfare throughout his known world.13 He also, like Greeks before him, 
articulated its cause as a desire for retribution, “damaging” a person who 
has wronged the angered individual.14  
In the intervening millennia since Seneca—and, notably, in the post-
September 11, 2001, American milieu, or in the aftermath of the 2008 and 
2016 elections of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump—anger as 
an emotion with a critical political valence has come back into sharpened 
focus in humanities and social science research.15 Some, like John 
Ehrenreich in his recent book, Third Wave Capitalism, link anger (with 
anxiety and rage) to overarching structural problems in government and the 
economy in capitalist, industrialized societies like the U.S., opening the 
door to systemic and structural discussions of great value here.16 
Researchers in philosophy, politics, and psychology have not reached a 
consensus on which emotions could underlie political systems’ outcomes, 
whether in the case of individual election results or in terms of the 
theorized, oft-studied polarization of American elites and voters.17 All the 
while, anger has been a recurrent subject of focus for intuitive reasons – as 
a powerful emotion intertwined with individual, group, and systemic 
 
otherwise,” which Nietzsche laconically calls “a piece of [moral] perfection … difficult to 
believe”) (emphases in original) (hereinafter “GENEALOGY”).  
 13. Id. at 18–19.  
 14. Seneca, supra note 12, at 20. 
 15. See generally Antoine J. Banks, The Public’s Anger: White Racial Attitudes and 
Opinions Toward Health Care Reform, 36 POL. BEHAVIOR 493 (2014) (on the intersections 
of race and emotions/affect amid health care reform debates of President Obama’s first 
term); Sue Campbell, Being Dismissed: The Politics of Emotional Expression, 9 HYPATIA 
46 (1994) (discussing, inter alia, how emotion terms characterize and dismiss women in 
political and public forums); Todd H. Hall & Andrew A.G. Ross, Affective Politics after 
9/11, 69 INT’L ORG. 847 (2015) (extending emotional/affective politics research analyses to 
significant individual actors in post-9/11 international relations contexts); Lilliana Mason, 
“I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue 
Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 128 (2015) (relating research on emotions and emotional 
intensity to separate dimensions of political polarization in contemporary America); Patrick 
R. Miller, The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication, 32 POL. 
PSY. 575, 579–81 (2011) (finding, inter alia, a link between emotional intensity and political 
sophistication, and hence advancing Nussbaum’s view of emotion—including anger—as a 
cognitive process, while noting sophisticated political observers tend to better link their 
anger to relevant policies addressing their concerns); accord Shana Kushner Gadarian & 
Bethany Albertson, Anxiety, Immigration, and the Search for Information, 35 POL. PSY. 133 
(2014) (finding anxiety is linked to paying closer attention to news information, echoing 
Miller’s emotionality-sophistication findings). 
 16. JOHN EHRENREICH, THIRD WAVE CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY, POWER, AND THE 
PURSUIT OF SELF-INTEREST HAVE IMPERILED THE AMERICAN DREAM 154–72 (2016). 
 17. See, e.g., Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of Contemporary 
American Politics, 46 POLITY 411 (2014) (finding, inter alia, the U.S. electorate of the early 
2010s had become more sharply polarized than at any time since the Civil War).  
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political action and reaction, and thus of great importance to the legal 
institutions which adjudicate many of society’s conflicts. 
At least in Nussbaum’s view, anger (like grief) has complex overlaps 
with adjacent feelings and the broader affect of a given individual.18 One 
key emotion often linked to anger is ressentiment. The term owes its 
popularization in significant part to the thought experiment in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, where those who suffer 
indignities without any “proper response of action” (on account of their 
lower “moral” status) eventually will reach a kind of steady state of 
enduring, repressed disturbance.19 A generation later, Max Scheler 
described ressentiment somewhat more broadly as a “self-poisoning of the 
mind…a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression of 
certain emotions and affects,” e.g., “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the 
impulse to detract, and spite.”20 Scheler’s development of ressentiment 
recast it as a progressive mental state: it starts with repressed desires for 
retribution among “those who are ‘weak’ in some respect” (e.g., in social 
standing); over time, however, it becomes more than a mere emotion, 
eventually detaching from “definite objects” (like specific persons) and 
becoming directed more toward “the sting of authority” itself.21 
Ressentiment, while related, is not coterminous with resentment, and 
should be understood as a dynamic emotional state with long time horizons, 
including both sustained periods and discrete flashes of anger as 
possibilities. These three mental states—anger, resentment, ressentiment—
are linked, often working in tandem, but should be viewed as conceptually 
distinct.  
Despite the concerns of Seneca and his fellow Stoics about its potential 
for evil, anger in many legal contexts falls narrowly within Nussbaum’s 
cognitivist framing.22 One area where anger plays a substantial role but has 
been poorly conceptualized is in speech-related claims. Adapting Seneca’s 
understanding of anger as a retribution-seeking emotion flowing from 
another’s provocation to “retaliation,” the First Amendment’s “fighting 
words” doctrine set forth in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire has persisted for 
over 70 years.23 Part III, below, elaborates on the logic of Chaplinsky and 
 
 18. See generally THINKING ABOUT FEELING, supra note 2 at 271–74.  
 19. GENEALOGY, supra note 12 at 20 (describing the “slave revolt”). 
 20. MAX SCHELER, RESSENTIMENT 4 (1915) (Louis A. Coser trans. 2015) (hereinafter 
“RESSENTIMENT”). 
 21. Id. at 5–6.  
 22. For a discussion of voluntary manslaughter charges—in which a defendant’s 
murder charge may be reduced if the act of killing is proven to be “in response to [an 
‘adequate,’ ‘reasonable’] provocation” and “without sufficient cooling time,” among other 
requirements—see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND 
THE LAW 37–8 (2004). 
 23. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942); see also Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
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provides an overview of developments in free speech jurisprudence since it 
was decided, taking up the question of whether and, if so, to what extent—
American law properly captures the dynamics of anger and related 
emotions. Part III then turns to Brandenburg v. Ohio and the “incitement” 
doctrine articulated thereunder,24 explaining how the same foundational, 
cognitivist understanding of anger underlying both decisions elides anger’s 
many individual and contextual variations, despite different implications 
across the two doctrines. 
III. FREE SPEECH AND FURY: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 
INSULT, AND ANGER 
A. Generalized, Stepwise Approaches to First Amendment Free 
Speech Analysis 
Expansive free speech protections emerged relatively recently, coming 
through a series of First Amendment cases between 1919 and the early 
1940s.25 Initially, “social and religious activists” comprised some of the 
most famous litigants, among them “abolitionists, the anarchists, the 
Industrial Workers of the World, the Socialist party, and the early labor and 
women’s movements,” all of whom increasingly pressured state and federal 
courts to recognize their repression as inimical to democratic values.26 
Contemporary understandings of free speech doctrine first appeared only 
in various dissents from this era; in 1939’s Hague v. CIO, the Supreme 
Court finally articulated the classic view of public spaces like sidewalks 
and public parks as places “immemorially … held in trust for the use of the 
public,” including free speech, assembly, and other core First Amendment 
Rights.27 
This transformation was neither total nor inexorable through the 1950s 
and 1960s. The U.S. Supreme Court maintained a variety of restrictive 
doctrinal tests, like the “clear and present danger” test (where speech could 
be proscribed if it presented a “clear and present danger” of inciting 
 
REV. 799, 815 (2010) (discussing how various “First Amendment doctrines rely on a model 
of the audience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through masses of information 
to find truth,” but that exceptions, like Chaplinsky or the “incitement” of audiences under 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, remain relatively “rare” outliers); accord Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 24. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg’s established and extant doctrine 
is known by several terms, including (as here) reference to “incitement” or to its “imminent 
lawless action” (or “imminence”) test. These phrases are used interchangeably throughout 
this essay. 
 25. See generally David Kairys, Freedom of Speech 190, 191, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: 
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998). 
 26. Kairys, supra note 25, at 193. 
 27. Id. (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 515 (1939)); accord Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
  
218 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:2 
unlawful conduct), established in the 1919 case Schenck v. United States.28 
Although Schenck ostensibly overruled the earlier “bad tendency” test 
under Patterson v. Colorado, from a decade earlier, the same “bad 
tendency” test was used during the term immediately following Schenck, 
leaving a consistent understanding of free speech and its limits in flux.29 
But by the 1960s and 1970s, the “liberal paradigm” of modern First 
Amendment jurisprudence had largely established its continuing, canonical 
two-step analytical framework for free speech challenges.30 Under the 
liberal paradigm, speech first is “categorized as either protected or 
unprotected based on its subject matter,” with content-based (or viewpoint-
based) regulations of speech assessed as presumptively unconstitutional.31 
If the regulated speech in question is found to be protected, such speech 
generally cannot be curtailed unless the state can prove that their action 
restricting it “is furthering a compelling interest than cannot be furthered” 
by less-restrictive means.32 Unprotected speech, meanwhile, can include 
forms of speech relevant for present purposes, including “incitement to 
imminent lawless action” and “fighting words.”33 Other doctrines address 
idiosyncrasies across a range of speech contexts from commercial speech 
to prior restraints on press publications,34 or permit reasonable “time, place, 
manner” (“TPM”) restrictions on the manner in which speech can occur in 
public venues,35 but the same basic framework governs all free speech 
claims of present concern. 
B. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Its Progeny, and Free Speech 
Jurisprudence of Anger 
In Chaplinsky, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses appealed his 
conviction under New Hampshire’s Public Laws, which forbade 
individuals from, inter alia, addressing “any offensive, derisive or 
annoying word to any other person” in public spaces.36 Chaplinsky 
admitted to “distributing the literature of his sect,” which triggered public 
 
 28. Kairys, supra note 25 at 196; accord Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 29. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616 (1919) (applying the “bad tendency” test in upholding the conviction of a leaflet 
distributor).  
 30. Kairys, supra note 25, at 197. 
 31. Kairys, supra note 25, at 197. 
 32. This, in other words, is the quintessential “strict scrutiny” standard. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 197–99.  
 35. Id. at 197; for an illustration of overlaps between TPM and implicitly content-
specific speech restrictions, see McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 493 (2014) (unanimously 
holding a Massachusetts “buffer zone” law prohibiting protest of abortion clinics 
unconstitutional on grounds that it was insufficiently narrowly tailored and thus infringed 
free speech).  
 36. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
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complaints and eventual intervention by the City Marshal.37 The Marshal 
“warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless,” but, after 
persisting, a traffic officer apprehended Chaplinsky later the same day.38 
When the Marshal encountered Chaplinsky and the traffic officer en route 
to the station, Chaplinsky allegedly uttered the words which made the case 
famous, calling the Marshal a “damned fascist.”39 
Proceeding to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and eventually 
appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Chaplinsky lost his case every step 
of the way.40 In upholding Chaplinsky’s conviction, the U.S. Supreme 
Court put forth its canonical articulation for permitting state actors to 
restrain “fighting words,” which merits quotation in full:  
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech 
is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and 
the insulting or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been 
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.41 
The U.S. Supreme Court insisted later in the opinion it was bound to 
defer to New Hampshire interpretations of state law,42 but the “fighting 
words” doctrine it propounded as a matter of constitutional law was its own 
creation. The attendant Chaplinsky test, like other legal tests referenced 
above,43 applies a reasonableness standard, i.e., what “would be … likely 
to cause an average addressee to fight,” in establishing whether a 
censorious state action is constitutional.44 
Chaplinsky quickly proved controversial, producing as it did a 
seemingly nebulous principle in free speech jurisprudence. By the early 
1950s, subsequent free speech cases began to curtail Chaplinsky’s reach,45 
 
 37. Id. at 569–70. 
 38. Id. at 570. 
 39. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. The exact phrasing has been given as a “damned 
fascist” or alternately a “goddamned fascist” in various apocrypha to the case. 
 40. Id. at 568–69.  
 41. Id. at 571–72 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 572. 
 43. See notes 6–7, supra, and accompanying discussion.  
 44. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. 
 45. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (restricting Chaplinsky, 
holding that words constituting “part of arguments on questions of wide public interest and 
freedom” cannot be “fighting words” within Chaplinsky’s meaning). 
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even as the scope of free speech rights overall remained less capacious than 
they are today. Still, the Supreme Court’s midcentury cases established 
broad outlines for constitutional regulations of speech that remain, as in 
cases of “fighting words” described above. Altogether, from Chaplinsky 
through signal cases in the late 1960s, the range of speech the government 
may proscribe ex ante (through prior restraints) or may halt while underway 
grew modestly to include speech that is likely to incite violence; lies; the 
lewd and profane; and speech which falls into other categories of marginal 
speech46 with low or entirely lacking “value” to merit state protection.47 
In the last seven decades, all these varieties of less-protected or wholly 
unprotected speech—and the Chaplinsky rule on “fighting words” 
notably—have been repeatedly challenged. Chaplinsky’s original rule, 
unlike many others, has been narrowed with great regularity; after R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, the “fighting words” doctrine’s status has been described 
variously as “confusion”48 or as being “quarantined,”49 if still short of 
functionally dead. In R.A.V., the Court unanimously declared a St. Paul, 
Minnesota ordinance unconstitutional on grounds that it was an 
impermissible content-based regulation of speech and reversed the 
attendant conviction of a teenager for burning a cross on the property of a 
Black family in the city.50 The ordinance at issue in R.A.V. expressly was 
written with the “fighting words” doctrine in mind, but as the Supreme 
Court’s majority declared the law unconstitutional on its face, the Court 
thus failed to reach the question of permissible post-Chaplinsky grounds 
for proscribing incendiary individual speech.51 In short, the content 
specificity of the St. Paul law, constituting a content-based regulation, 
obviated any need for analyzing questions about the earlier precedent.52 
Adding further confusion, a decade after R.A.V., the Supreme Court 
 
 46. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1984). 
 47. Among the “values” of free speech guarded by the First Amendment are those of 
democratic deliberation; the search for and elevation of truth; and ensuring maximal liberty 
vis-à-vis pluralistic society. See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-
Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 326 (1994); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public 
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) (on democratic deliberation and the search for truth 
functions). For a broad overview of limited situations in which content-based regulation of 
speech is permissible and the underlying logic, see  Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation 
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). 
 48. Melody C. Hurdle, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the 
Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1143 (1994) 1148. 
 49. Burton Caine, The Trouble with Fighting Words: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is 
a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 547 
(2004). 
 50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
 51. Id. at 381. 
 52. Id. at 382–83. 
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distinguished protected expressive conduct from unprotected targeted 
intimidation in Virginia v. Black.53 In Black, the Court struck down in part 
a Virginia statute that defined cross-burning as prima facie evidence of an 
intent to discriminate, but upheld the conviction of a Virginia Beach man 
for his specific act of burning a cross on a family’s lawn as an instance of 
targeted intimidation, i.e., an unprotected “true threat.”54 As will be 
examined in greater detail below,55 the very boundaries between these 
categories of speech are not entirely clear; reading R.A.V. and Virginia v. 
Black in tandem highlights some of the difficulty in distinguishing among 
fully protected political expressions (including baldly racist viewpoints) 
and specifically targeted “true threats.” 
C. Beyond Individual Engagement: Brandenburg, “Incitement” and 
“Imminent Lawless Action,” and First Amendment Doctrines for 
Group-Related Speech 
In some of the signal cases surveyed above, the cognitivist view of 
emotional processes and of anger are apparent: “fighting words” are a rare, 
and generally sidelined, exception to free speech protections in part because 
they are expected to be so provocative to the listener in a flash of anger. In 
those contexts, “fighting words” are valueless speech under the First 
Amendment because reasonable listeners, angered by the insulting 
utterance, should be expected to react. Otherwise, free speech 
jurisprudence expects some greater measure of restraint. Yet a core 
problem with this framework is how narrowly irrepressible anger was 
construed, as well as the absence of any consideration of how individual 
positionalities, of speakers or listeners, may affect real-world interactions. 
Leading American jurists’ understanding of anger, like Nussbaum’s, also 
remains limited by the contexts in which they work best: one-on-one 
interactions between speakers (or a speaker and a listener) engaging in real-
time where an egregious insult is lobbed from one to the other.  
Anger’s complexities demand deeper interrogation. After all, one-to-
one, real-time interactions are not always the basis for violent or otherwise 
unlawful conduct in response to contentious speech. Across the various 
scenarios of in-person listeners’ reactions (e.g., including Chaplinsky), free 
speech jurisprudence separates spoken expressions from “actions” as 
distinct concepts. A person’s actions are fair game for regulation and 
restriction under the constitution, but their expressions—and especially the 
specific content or viewpoint they express56 – typically are not. 
 
 53. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 54. Id.; accord Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (first articulating the “true 
threats” doctrine). 
 55. See infra, Part IV. 
 56. See notes 26–35, 51–54, supra and accompanying discussion. 
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Yet, in the concept of “incitement” under Brandenburg v. Ohio,57 
similar reasoning processes yielded even graver contradictions. While 
demonstrating a somewhat more-sophisticated understanding of duration 
and timing issues relating to anger after the earlier “fighting words” cases, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg ruled that Ohio’s criminal 
syndicalism law prohibiting certain speech which called for illegal action 
violated free speech rights, establishing an “imminence” requirement for 
halting or barring a speaker based on the content of their speech.58 More 
formally, the Court articulated a two-pronged test for lawfully prohibiting 
“inciting” speech: the speaker’s words must (1) be “directed at inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action” and (2) be “likely to incite or produce 
such action.”59 “Mere advocacy” or “teaching” of illegality, in other words, 
cannot be prohibited by the state; a speaker must actually seek and be likely 
to achieve whatever unlawful conduct.  
In the five decades since Brandenburg was decided, the foregoing test 
has remained intact and virtually unchanged.60 More recently, Brandenburg 
became a subject of academic interest in the wake of the September 11, 
2001, terror attacks61 and—of even greater interest here—became a 
recurring focus amid today’s prevalent, online-based forms of speech.62 
Regarding the former, Brandenburg has been at the periphery of various 
cases concerning free speech and other civil liberties in the “post-9/11 
world,” including those “upholding measures taken in connection with 
airport security, subway searches, restrictions on political speech at 
political conventions, and immigration decisions.”63 Most prominently, 
whereas Brandenburg imposes imminence and likelihood requirements in 
restricting speakers who may incite others, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project upheld the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”), effectively ruling that nonprofit organizations could be barred 
from instructing foreign terrorist groups about international humanitarian 
 
 57. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 58. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
 59. Id. at 447. This test became known as the “imminence” test or the “clear and present 
danger” test; again the terms are used interchangeably throughout this essay, though the 
latter is more commonly used in the literature; accord David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, 
Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1233  (1998). 
 60. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam) (affirming Brandenburg and 
clarifying the imminence requirement necessarily excludes censuring future lawless action); 
see also Part IV, infra for discussion. 
 61. See, e.g., Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Innocence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the 
Post-9/11 World, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2014). 
 62. See Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy on Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the 
Internet Era, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 227 (2000). 
 63. Cover, supra note 61, at 1430–31. 
  
Summer 2020] ANGER, GENDER, RACE, AND THE LIMITS 223 
law encompassed within AEDPA’s meaning of providing “material 
support” for terrorists.64   
Another modern phenomenon, one which complicates the decades-old 
Brandenburg standard and the disjointed Chaplinsky framework, has been 
under-theorized despite its growing prominence: stochastic violence. 
Stochastic violence itself generalizes the earlier phrase “stochastic 
terrorism,” most-frequently used in journalistic contexts, which denotes a 
speaker’s “use of mass communications,” e.g., online outlets and social 
networks, to inspire others to perpetrate violence.65 Neither the 
Brandenburg test nor its derivative elaborations in Hess v. Indiana had 
contemplated this distinct speech-violence dynamic, notwithstanding 
stochastic violence conceptually underlying judicial analyses in several 
high-profile cases.66  
Brandenburg and the “incitement” doctrine it formalized rest on an 
understanding of anger that is facially consistent with Chaplinksy—i.e., 
anger as a sudden, sharp emotion that stultifies, if not overrides, reason. But 
where these cases diverge appears telling. In Chaplinsky, the sharp anger 
of listeners in response to what was deemed a galling insult led the Court 
 
 64. Id. at 1431–35; Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). See also 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214, § 303.) 
 65. See, e.g., G2geek, Stochastic Terrorism: Triggering the Shooters, DAILY KOS (Jan. 
10, 2011), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2011/1/10/934890/- [ https://perma.cc/6ERK-
QQ8V]. 
 66. See, e.g., Andy Campbell, 2 Proud Boys Sentenced to 4 Years in Prison over Gang 
Assault in New York, HUFFPOST (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/proud-
boys-sentenced-new-york_n_5daf2841e4b0f34e3a7d652c [https://perma.cc/6XPP-ZV7Z] 
(discussing the cases of two far-right Proud Boys gang members—Maxwell Hare and John 
Kinsman—were sentenced to four years in prison each, along with “another five years of 
supervised release”; during their sentencing, the Manhattan judge, Mark Dwyer, connected 
them to Proud Boys leader Gavin McInnes, a co-founder of VICE Media and virulent racist 
“who has repeatedly tried to distance himself” from the organization). See also Sarah 
Mervosh, F.B.I. Arrests U.S. Soldier Who Discussed Bomb Plot, Authorities Say, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/us/us-army-soldier-arrested-
Jarrett-William-Smith.html [https://perma.cc/3NTZ-R9KW] (reporting on the arrest of 
active-duty soldier Jarrett William Smith, suspected of plotting to bomb “a major news 
network” and threatening then-Democratic Primary candidate Beto O’Rourke’s 
assassination); Suspected Neo-Nazi Charged with Gun Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 
14, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/suspected-neo-nazi-charged-gun-crime 
[https://perma.cc/X3BY-QU5A] (disclosing and discussing the arrest of Aiden Bruce-
Umbaugh, who ‘was charged with [unlawful] possession of a firearm” after being “arrested 
in Post, Texas, dressed in tactical gear and in possession of multiple assault rifles” and “at 
least 1,500 rounds of ammunition”); Jason Wilson, Far Right Network Orchestrated 
Synagogue Attacks, FBI Says, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2019/nov/16/far-right-network-orchestrated-synagogue-attacks-fbi-says [https:/ 
/perma.cc/M7WC-EAMQ] (reporting how Richard Tobin, of Nazi group The Base, directed 
and coordinated multiple acts of vandalism against synagogues in the Midwest, including 
defacing buildings “with fascist and [anti-Semitic] propaganda”). 
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to categorize the speaker’s utterances as valueless and unprotected; in 
Brandenburg, a case whose plaintiff was a rallying member of the Ku Klux 
Klan, listeners’ outraged responses dropped from the analysis altogether, 
since Brandenburg himself was speaking only of his ideology, not 
imminent intent to act. Granted, the Ohio criminal syndicalism law was 
fatally flawed inasmuch as it was “overly broad” anyway, encompassing 
far more than the Klan in its overreach.67 Nonetheless, the Brandenburg 
framework subtly removed emotional (i.e., intensely angry) reactions to a 
specific form of speech (i.e., racist speech) from inclusion among those 
instances where the cognitivist model contemplates impulsive reactivity. 
Regardless of the Court’s intent, no discernible principle for this 
classification decision is apparent. 
These cases significantly diverge in two further senses. First, 
Chaplinsky is not a particularly robust precedent in the present century; it 
has been described in recent years as a “quarantined”68 doctrine, its crucial 
“injury” prong “deemed no longer operative,”69 and some of its (few) more-
recent favorable citations in federal court opinions have been doctrinally 
muddled at best.70 The same cannot be said for Brandenburg, which 
remains actively litigated and an active force in First Amendment 
scholarship. Second, Brandenburg’s extant doctrine governing 
“incitement” adds some valuable nuance to the idea of anger under the First 
Amendment—it still presumes anger can override reason, but it 
acknowledges that direct insults are not the only way for speakers to trigger 
anger, and thus action, among listeners. Instead, Brandenburg 
contemplates agreeing listeners acting on the speaker’s words encouraging 
the former to engage in “imminent lawless action.” Although this nuance 
is a welcome corrective to Chaplinsky’s oversimplified framework, 
Brandenburg poses other challenges for contemporary CLS theorists and 
practitioners, several of which merit detailed discussion. 
 
 67. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (articulating a “line between ideas 
and overt acts” as demarcating what is and is not subject to permissible government 
regulation). 
 68. Caine, supra note 49 (concluding, inter alia, that it would be a mistake “to conclude 
that there is no danger to freedom of speech on the theory that Chaplinsky has been 
quarantined and the fighting words doctrine rendered lame” because “the virus remains 
viable”). 
 69. Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 
1548 (2017). 
 70. JoAnne Sweeny, Incitement in the Era of Trump and Charlottesville, 47 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 585, 620 (2019) (citing United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1016 (7th Cir. 2012), 
which used the Chaplinsky framework to decide a “purely verbal criminal solicitation 
case”). 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS:  
THE GENDERED AND RACIALIZED NARROWNESS OF 
ANGER UNDER THE LAW 
A. The Narrowness of “Anger” in First Amendment Law: “Fighting 
Words” for Whom? 
First Amendment law has generally been leery of government 
attempts to change the marketplace of emotions – except when it 
has not been. Scientific evidence indicates that emotion and 
rationality are not opposed, as the law often presumes, but rather 
inextricably linked. There is no judgment, whether moral or 
otherwise, without emotions to guide our choices. Judicial failure 
to grapple with this reality has produced … puzzles in the law.  
-Rebecca Tushnet71 
 
The precision and accuracy of the “fighting words” doctrine may be 
challenged on at least three grounds. First, it oversimplifies the emotion at 
the individual level, drowning out variation in anger’s experience and 
expression through its slippery “reasonable person” standard, failing to 
account for how social forces affect certain individuals—notably women, 
non-whites, and other members of historically marginalized 
communities—and thus limit their expressions of emotion. Second, this 
area of jurisprudence overly relies on an individual-rationalist perspective, 
problematically excluding group dynamics while setting up discordant 
approaches vis-à-vis other free speech doctrines, like those on incitement 
and the speech-violence nexus more generally. Finally, and extending both 
of these concerns, online speech combines the preceding two problems with 
the conundrum of physical distance. Some speech may provoke and cross 
the Chaplinsky-defined threshold for “fighting words,” inciting a similar 
rage, but online “listeners,” lacking immediate, in-person recourse for 
releasing their anger, then lash out in a manner more attenuated than the 
Court in Chaplinsky (or Brandenburg, for the matter) contemplated. Of 
these concerns, the limited conceptualization of anger—its gendered and 
racialized elements—is crucial, the primary focus below. 
 
 
 71. Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2392 (2014). Cf. Lauren Berlant, The Epistemology of State Emotion, in 
DISSENT IN DANGEROUS TIMES 47, 47 (Austin Sarat ed., 2005) (reifying the 
rationality/emotion dichotomy and arguing that “political rationality as the core practice of 
[American] democracy” is being supplanted by “a scene for the orchestration of public 
feelings … of politics as a scene of emotional contestation,” including a particular post-9/11 
public anger). 
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B. Unpacking the Individual Characteristics of Listeners: The 
Pernicious Presumptions Underlying Free Speech Exceptions 
Like Seneca and Nussbaum, America’s founding-era constitutional 
debates—including the eventual First Amendment—treated emotions as 
both deeply political and yet rationally manageable, with a particular focus 
on ameliorating impulses to act on anger.72 Over the intervening centuries, 
abovementioned First Amendment cases reified this perspective through 
the evolving “fighting words” and “incitement” doctrines. With Chaplinsky 
as the signal case in the former area, however, the Supreme Court’s 
approach to conceptualizing anger suffers several shortcomings. 
Chaplinsky involved face-to-face, real-time actors and conceives of 
anger as a snap response to a direct insult. This is an overly limited view; 
anger can take on many temporal forms beyond the near-instantaneous, 
reactive cases as in Chaplinsky, and it is affected by situational contexts 
(venue and social setting, for instance) and individual experiences (gender, 
race, class). Absent these considerations, the First Amendment’s “fighting 






 72. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the first entry of what would become The 
Federalist Papers, “[W]e are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are 
influenced by purer principles than their antagonists … To judge from the conduct of the 
opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the 
justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of 
their declamations and by the bitterness of their invectives.” Alexander Hamilton, The 
Federalist No. 1, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 7, 8 (Ian Shapiro, ed. 2009). Here, while 
Hamilton raises the perpetual concern among the Framers regarding the “passions” of 
individuals and groups, he also advances a view of American democracy as a deliberative, 
rationalist one—i.e., one where (more or less careful) reasoning may at least temper 
emotional reactions to political events and undergird a representative political system. For 
a general discussion of deliberative democratic theory (and its limits), see Magdalena 
Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, & Anders Uhlin, Democracy in Global Governance: The Promises 
and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors, 16 GLOB. GOV. 81, 84 (2010) (defining the deliberative 
democratic model as a system which “emphasizes deliberation among citizens [and] their 
representatives” inasmuch as informed opinions are shared, tested, and revised collectively 
and continuously); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
(1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (2004); 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY 
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996); Shawn W. Rosenberg, Rethinking Democratic 
Deliberation: The Limits and Potential of Citizen Participation, 39 POLITY 335, 336 (2007); 
IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 49 (2006). Cf. Lynn M. Sanders, Against 
Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 348 (1997) (critiquing deliberative democracy and its 
advocates on grounds that evidence for “substantive or empirical” support among “ordinary 
citizens” for a more-deliberative system is lacking). 
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1. Social Differences in Allowable Anger: Gender  
As constitutional law scholars have observed, language throughout the 
Chaplinsky opinion constrains anger to a gendered, i.e., male perspective.73 
Chaplinsky, in that sense, is a “hypermasculine” exemption from presumed 
“gentlemanly” expectations of conduct among men.74 Indeed, other 
stereotypically “masculine” qualities abound in free speech doctrines and 
marquee cases from the last century,75 effectively calibrating the Court’s 
analysis in First Amendment cases toward a masculine view or ideal as a 
default. That this is true for the Court’s general understanding of anger—
and concomitant evasion of the social contexts and norms constraining or 
liberating individuals’ expressions of it—poses one of the central problems 
of concern here.  
As journalist Rebecca Traister explained in her recent book, Good and 
Mad, American women face categorically separate norms of conduct and 
expectations in expressing their anger, one where women’s repressed anger 
builds over time after being targeted by pervasive sexual misconduct or 
being “ignored, sidelined, and not taken seriously,” yet conventions 
militate against acting in any manner that appears “belligerent” or 
confrontational.76 From the introduction, Traister juxtaposes her approach 
to anger with Nussbaum’s earlier Anger and Forgiveness.77 For Traister, 
anger is not an “inherently vengeful impulse, and … therefore punitive and 
counterproductive” as Nussbaum asserts; rather, anger can arise from 
“objection to injustice” and “inequity” in society broadly or, in an 
“optimistic” sense too often ignored, as “a communicative tool, a call to 
action.”78 While pointing out how experiences and expressions of anger 
among women may deviate from Nussbaum and American jurists’ 
understanding, Traister thus also poses a keen challenge to Seneca’s 
elemental assumption: that anger itself is a necessarily “bad” or damaging 
emotion in some way. 
 
 73. See John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
261, 263 (2009) (“the fighting words doctrine targets men and draws from a gendered 
worldview … and, although women theoretically can also retaliate with violence against 
men or women, [the] Court never refers to the female perspective. For the Court, only men 
threaten the public peace with their anger and, thus, only men must not be needlessly 
aggravated”). See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 74. See Kang, supra note 73, at 263. 
 75. Id. at 265 (citing Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)) (propounding a 
“discourse about male identity” and the vital need for men to have “courage” in vindicating 
their constitutional rights). 
 76. REBECCA TRAISTER, GOOD AND MAD: THE REVOLUTIONARY POWER OF WOMEN’S 
ANGER xvi–xvii (2018). 
 77. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, ANGER AND FORGIVENESS: RESENTMENT, GENEROSITY, 
JUSTICE (2016). 
 78. TRAISTER, supra note 76, at xxvi–xxvii. 
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In short, Traister’s book makes the case that American women’s 
outwardly expressed rage is experiencing a “contemporary reemergence … 
as a mass impulse” during the Trump era.79 Throughout, women’s public 
anger is shown as bipartisan,80 long-simmering,81 and increasingly 
undisguised, occasionally acidly profane.82 While norms may be shifting 
(among some) and more American women are claiming a broader range of 
outward angry expression, especially among younger Americans.83 Traister 
underlines throughout her writing that shifts are not complete 
transformations. Even three-plus years after the 2016 election, “rage is an 
emotion that is permitted and encouraged in (some) men,” but remains 
“forbidden, invalidated, and treated as a path to self-defeat” for many 
women by dominant figures in society.84 Good and Mad, after all, 
catalogues the anger and actions of some of America’s most-powerful 
women in media, entertainment, academia, and politics; they all face 
double standards and regressive gendered tropes with regularity, suggesting 
those in lower socioeconomic strata face even greater social and normative 
impediments to expressing themselves. 
 
 79. Id. at 2. 
 80. For example, Traister cites Tea Party-linked women, both leaders and supporters, 
angrily engaging in a traditionalist blowback against the Obama administration—part of a 
lose bloc of traditionalist women dating at least to Phyllis Schlafly’s “antifeminist crusades 
of the 1970s and 80s.” Id. at 6–7. 
 81. Id. at 9 (“[I]n the years leading up to the 2016 election, there was a building public 
rage” among women and a greater willingness “to broadcast … powerful, desperately felt 
anger” in public). 
 82. In one brief passage, Traister notes the cases of two women elected to high-profile 
public offices: San Juan, Puerto Rico Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz (“‘I don’t give a shit,’ Cruz 
told reporters when asked about the president’s criticism”) and U.S. Senator Kirsten 
Gillibrand (D-NY) (“Gillibrand, too, stopped being polite, telling [Traister] during a spring 
2017 interview that officials are in Washington ‘to help people, and if we’re not helping 
people we should go the fuck home’”). Id. at 36. 
 83. A captivating example highlighted by Traister is the “incandescently furious” 
Emma González, one of the student leaders pushing for nationwide gun control reforms 
following the 2018 mass shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, 
Florida, where 17 students were killed and more than a dozen more were injured. Id. at 42. 
Accord Chelsea Bailey, At Rally, Parkland Shooting Survivors Rail Against Gun Laws, NRA 
and Trump, NBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/rally-
parkland-shooting-survivors-rail-against-gun-laws-nra-trump-n849076 [https://perma.cc/ 
72TE-G6BF]. 
 84. TRAISTER, supra note 76, at 61. Post-election examples cited include media 
censuring of late-night host Samantha Bee’s profanity-laden monologues and comedian 
Michelle Wolf’s “brutal” standup set at the 2018 White House Correspondents’ Dinner, to-
date the last such Dinner to have a headliner. Id. at 104–05; the at-best partial reckonings 
for high-profile men accused of horrific, sustained abuse of women, such as film producer 
Harvey Weinstein, talk show host Charlie Rose, and producer and standup comic Louis C.K. 
Id. at 136–46; and the sustained abuse of elected women who “had led the charge” in seeking 
U.S. Senator Al Franken’s resignation following multiple reports of sexual misconduct. Id. 
at 163–65. 
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Generalizing these observations in legal contexts specifically, feminist 
legal theorist Frances Olsen has explained them as a corpus of tendencies 
toward gendered, hierarchical, and illusory “dualisms” in law.85 Several of 
these erstwhile dualisms, “rational/irrational,” “thought/feeling,” 
“reason/emotion,” underscore the preceding challenges to the First 
Amendment’s conception of anger.86 Yet, Olsen argues law should reject 
these false dichotomies altogether, not just recalibrate them, on both 
empirical and normative grounds.87 As Olsen explains, the presence of such 
gendered dualisms in law “accept in general the proposition that men and 
women are different” without evidence and preclude considering their full 
complexities.88 Rules designed with a narrow, stereotypically male 
perspective in mind, like the machismo, snap-reactive one evinced in 
Chaplinsky, are “too specific, definite, and contextualized to count as 
principles,” because the social contexts of all other perspectives, including 
those of all non-men, can never fit into their paradigm.89 Constitutional law 
leaves room for “minor exceptions and subdoctrines that permit some 
influence of the subjective, contextual, and personalized,” but the limits 
placed on “subjective” or “personalized” considerations at the margins, 
combined with the a priori general orientation toward principle, rationality, 
and objectivity, only reaffirms biases favoring male-identified sides of the 
dualisms Olsen addresses.90  
2. Social Differences in Allowable Anger: Race and Racism  
Race and racism, whether witting or not, present additional challenges 
to the Chaplinsky model. For nonwhite Americans, racist stereotypes and 
diverging governmental and cultural norms about expressing public anger 
compound the complexities of expressing or repressing anger noted above. 
Moreover, the state’s responses to different individuals and groups’ public 
displays of anger—as in protest actions—vary on the basis of race. For 
example, the recent cases of mass protests in Ferguson (2014) and the 
Women’s Marches (2017 onward) displayed enormous disparities: police 
responses to the majority-Black protesters in Ferguson were militarized and 
violent compared to the anodyne permissiveness of authorities toward the 
visibly white Women’s March organizers and attendees.91 In addition, race 
 
 85. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
691, 691–92 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998). 
 86. Id. at 691. 
 87. See Olsen, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. at 695. 
 89. Olsen, supra note 85, at 701. 
 90. Id. at 703. 
 91. See Abby Harrington, Tanks and Rubber Bullets vs. Pussy Hats and High-Fives: A 
Comparative Look at the 2014 Ferguson Uprising and the 2017 Women’s March on 
Washington, 31 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 101 (2019). Accord Rod K. Brunson & Jody 
Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The Experience of African American Youths, 20 
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and racism are not merely social phenomena, but instead are embedded in 
past and present state institutions and often undergird actions taken by 
state-linked actors. Those state-individual contexts include, among others, 
racist patterns of policing and incarceration, as well as profoundly 
asymmetric rates of arrest and prosecution.92 These considerations form a 
daunting backdrop for nonwhite (and non-male) listeners, restraining their 
responses in ways not contemplated by the Court in Chaplinsky and later 
cases. Black and brown Americans have myriad deeply rooted claims for 
condemning state authorities, for angrily castigating them in terms far 
harsher than Chaplinsky’s censured utterance, but they also face far greater 
chances of harm if they choose to do so. Censure limits free speech rights; 
speaking out against racist systems often deprives speakers of color their 
very lives. 
Where race and sex intersect, like for Black women and other women 
of color, the social context becomes more complex, with overlapping 
dimensions of marginalization and norm-based censure. While the 
contributions of critical race theory (CRT) to legal scholarship writ large 
have been exemplary, constitutional law theorists and the federal courts 
alike still exhibit, as Kimberlé Crenshaw has put it, a “tendency to treat race 
and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis.”93  
Crenshaw has explained that this tendency is “perpetuated by [the] 
single-axis framework” which dominates theory and practice, a framework 
perhaps best illustrated by antidiscrimination law cases where Black 
women must elect either race or sex/gender as grounds for their claims, but 
not both.94 Such “compound claims,” according to federal courts’ reasoning 
across several cases, are not within the bounds of discrimination 
contemplated by Congress when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964; in 
effect, such cases have held, the “discrimination against Black women” 
cannot conceivably “exist independently from the experiences of white 
women or of Black men.”95 Even where white men expressly are not the 
implied or explicit presumed perspective under law, as with legislation and 
litigation concerning sex discrimination, there remains an “implicit 
grounding of white female experiences” that prevents Black (and other 
 
GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 533–34 (2006); TRAISTER, supra note 76 at 8, 29–31. For a discussion 
of the background for local police departments’ militarization from the 1990s to the present, 
seeKATHLEEN BELEW, BRING THE WAR HOME: THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT AND 
PARAMILITARY AMERICA 188–91 (2018). 
 92. See, e.g., ANGELA DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND 
IMPRISONMENT 11–13, 17–21 (2017). 
 93. Kimberlé Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and 
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356, 356 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 
1998). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 357. See also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. as amended (2009). 
  
Summer 2020] ANGER, GENDER, RACE, AND THE LIMITS 231 
nonwhite) women from making specific legal claims—that their 
discrimination is because they are Black women (or they are Latina, or 
Indigenous women, and so on).96 In such a way, the relegation of nonwhite 
perspectives beyond the default framework of free speech jurisprudence 
compounds the relegation of women’s perspectives; Black and brown 
women, specifically, are doubly overlooked and unconsidered in these 
cases. 
The confluence of a (white, male) exclusionary lexicon of emotions in 
First Amendment doctrine with the preceding realities of race-based or 
multidimensional marginalization should give theorists and practitioners 
pause. These issues are likely further compounded by other overlapping 
characteristics—from class and socioeconomic status to sexuality, religious 
affiliations, disability status, and more—which configure individuals’ lived 
realities, including emotional expression or repression.97 The cognitivist 
view undergirding First Amendment jurisprudence simply does not account 
for this multiplicity in speech settings and normative restrictions on actual 
individual expressions. The costs and perils facing angry listeners are not 
equally distributed—nor are individuals’ attendant chances of being 
afforded grace after acting from a place of anger. These blindspots must be 
identified fully and brought into theoretical and practical discussions of 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
C. Law’s Muddled Understandings of Anger’s Duration and Relation 
with Ressentiment and Resentment 
While the Court’s understandings of anger, rage, and resentment at 
least are serviceably close to the traditional philosophical conceptions of 
Seneca and Martha Nussbaum, however limited, the legal field’s 
comprehension of ressentiment is far less clear. 
Per Traister, longevity and suppression are recurring themes in the 
recent history of women’s rage—the prolonged duration of cumulative 
adverse experiences driving women’s post-election rage, for instance, defy 
 
 96. Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 359. For nonwhite women, therefore, the intersections 
of race and sex mean discrimination can arise in one of three ways: “from sex discrimination 
or race discrimination or both.” Id. at 361 (emphasis added). Sexuality, class, and other 
bases for discriminatory treatment may add further dimensions atop these, which are 
discussed briefly in Part III(B)(3), infra, although no comprehensive account of all potential 
dimensions is feasible in this limited space. For a broad overview of “intersectionality” in 
law and politics, see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); 
Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647 (1996). 
For a broad critique of single-axis frameworks and their erasure of Black women’s 
particularly situated experiences, see BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM (1995). 
 97. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 93. See also Lucy A. Williams, Welfare and 
Legal Entitlements: The Social Roots of Poverty, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE 569 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998). 
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the characterizations of Nussbaum or Supreme Court justices.98 Still other 
scenarios clearly implicate the concepts of resentment and ressentiment in 
ways that blur the distinction between “advocacy” and action specifically 
found in Brandenburg. Contemporary followers of various American far-
right movements, for example, recently were described as a precise class of 
“bigot,” one who harbors a “fierce resentment of modernity’s advocates 
and beneficiaries,” combining both the envious idea of ressentiment in 
Nietzsche and Scheler,99 but also on the vigorous resistance against “the 
forces of modernity,” which the bigot fears.100 A toxic mixture of fear, 
simmering resentments, and hatreds, when combined with a proximate 
trigger for anger amid less-constraining norms against expressing it, can 
prove combustible; repetitious “mere advocacy,” especially in the fervid, 
insular online ecosystem of far-right communities, may readily prompt 
targeted actions by reactionary acolytes.101  
Laws, like the Constitution itself, must achieve broad generality in their 
applications to individuals across varied experiences, positions, and time. 
But in making the “fighting words” doctrine, with an implicitly narrow, 
exclusionary conception of anger, the Supreme Court simply did not 
 
 98. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying discussion. See also Part IV(B)(2), supra 
for discussion of the interactions between race and gender, as they similarly implicate 
resentment and ressentiment. 
 99. See supra Part II, passim. 
 100. Stephen Eric Bronner, From Modernity to Bigotry, in CRITICAL THEORY AND 
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM 85, 89 (Jeremiah Morelock, ed. 2018). 
 101. Id. at 91–92. Even where ressentiment has been encompassed in academic works, 
many legal scholars addressing the concept do so through attenuated analysis—for instance, 
those who study the legal field’s representation in literature, film, and other popular media, 
see also, Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive: Retributivism and 
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2183 n. 133 
(2001) (“[W]hen I use ‘moralist’ or ‘moralizing’ I am referring to the scolding sensibility of 
the schoolteacher, the kind of person who punishes, and enjoys punishing, as a result of 
what Nietzsche called ‘ressentiment’); William H. Page, The Place of Law and Literature, 
39 VAND. L. REV. 391, 404 (1996) (defining ressentiment as a “prolonged sense of injury 
based on real or imagined insult”). Or in legal philosophy, as well as some others working 
from within various critical legal studies traditions, see also Lolita Buckner Inniss, A 
Domestic Right of Return: Race, Rights, and Residency in New Orleans in the Aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 325, 356 (2007) (“The ideological sibling of 
the culture of crime is the culture of victimhood, based on a ‘rhetoric of grievance’ and 
‘ressentiment’ that become part of a group’s ‘constitutive traits’”—both of which Inniss 
rejects.). To say scholars have not offered consistent characterizations of the term or fully 
understood its evolution over the last century would be an understatement. See generally 
Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies 
in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 424 (1993) (while critiquing critical legal studies on 
various grounds, Goodrich seems to endorse a comparison to the American Left’s general 
failure to command political power: A “‘pervasive melancholy’ … frequently interpreted as 
leading from politics to aesthetics—to the ‘hyperinflation of aesthetic discourses’—and 
from activism to passivity if not ressentiment.” What that means, one can only begin to 
guess, perhaps.). 
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contemplate the nuances of anger, resentments, and social constraints faced 
by a full majority of all Americans. 
D. Strategies for Decentering Gendered, Racialized First Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
1. Critical Legal Theories, Emotions, and Anger 
The foregoing analysis of free speech doctrines’ covertly gendered and 
racialized assumptions echoes several core premises of CLS. Borrowing 
Cornel West’s articulation, the conclusions are geared toward the 
imperatives of offering “theoretical critiques of [academic] liberal 
paradigms” and providing bases for action by and within “radical 
organizations that engage in extra parliamentary action,” all the while 
offering pragmatic lessons to legal practitioners.102 For legal theorists 
broadly, exposing the gendered, racialized conceptions of emotions and 
anger in First Amendment jurisprudence—and how these concepts 
ultimately exclude all but a small minority who effectively receive even 
greater legal protections—invites others to envision novel, creative means 
of erasing such obscure inequities. The key doctrines covered under 
Chaplinsky and Brandenburg, for instance, might be seen as worthy of 
sustained efforts to eliminate or significantly narrow them; conversely, one 
or another might be worth extending, broadening the reach to capture a 
fuller range of experiences surveyed above. While the takeaways discussed 
below suggest ranges of options, not certain conclusions, they seek West’s 
notion of giving “visibility and legitimacy” to otherwise overlooked issues 
in law and toward exposing “the intellectual blinders” of scholarship and 
practice which reify real-world inequities, damaging stereotypes, and 
resistant hierarchies.103  
2. Legal Activists and Practitioners: Revive Chaplinsky, 
Brandenburg – or Leave Them for Dead? 
For activists and practitioners, the “fighting words” doctrine of 
Chaplinsky presents two strategic possibilities looking ahead: reviving it, 
but with a more-expansive understanding of the emotions and experiences 
which may produce angered reactions to provoking speakers, or killing 
what remains of the dormant doctrine, suffused as it is with presumptions 
that exclude. Each strategy entails tradeoffs. Reviving Chaplinsky to 
include a greater range of individuals and groups’ experiences would allow 
future plaintiffs the benefit of a First Amendment jurisprudence which 
actually understands how anger functions. It is not always fleeting; it can 
result from repressed, simmering frustrations and emanate from a collective 
 
 102. Cornel West, The Role of Law in Progressive Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 708, 711 (David Kairys, 3d ed. 1998). 
 103. Id. at 714–15. 
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boiling-over; and it is constrained by social norms rooted in gender, race, 
and other characteristics, all of which place unequal expectations on 
different individuals’ emotional expressions. Given the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistent framing of racist speech and conduct seen in R.A.V. v. St. Paul 
and Virginia v. Black, using litigation as a strategy to widen the forms of 
speech understood as fighting words—and thus unprotected, with a greater 
range of listeners’ reactions viewed as reasonable—presents uncertainty. 
Conversely, attempts to finish off Chaplinsky, to finally overrule it on 
grounds of vagueness or its lack of workable evaluative standards, may 
remove a gendered, racialized doctrine from constitutional law. At the same 
time, doing so risks foreclosing litigation tactics in future cases where 
federal courts have (hypothetically) opened themselves to a more-nuanced 
understandings of positionality and identity.  
Brandenburg’s “incitement” (or “imminent lawless action”) concept 
presents an even more complex set of considerations. The “imminence” 
factor—requiring incitement to produce or be likely to produce unlawful 
action, essentially, right after the speaker has uttered it—may militate 
against minority groups and individuals’ interests in cases where extremist 
rhetoric calls for action vaguely or eventually, not imminently. This is not 
a hypothetical; rather, it reflects the rhetoric of far-right leaders which 
already has seeped into judicial analyses of their followers’ violent actions, 
as in two 2019 cases involving Gavin McInnes, a key figure in the Proud 
Boys gang, whose followers were sentenced to four years each in prison 
after perpetrating a gang assault.104 Those cases relate to a broader class of 
far-right speakers, activists, and perpetrators of violence, in the U.S. and 
globally, whose conduct undermines the Supreme Court’s attempt to 
distinguish fully protected, pure political expression from unprotected 
forms of incitement or true threats.  
To put a finer point on it, the doctrinal morass left by Chaplinsky, 
Brandenburg, and their combined progeny leads to questions of line-
drawing: When does fiery rhetoric become an invitation to commit 
violence? When ought such an invitiation trigger liability? Absent the 
“imminence” required under Brandenburg or the somewhat lesser 
requirements of threats under Watts, what workable alternative standard 
could courts use to proscribe later-in-time threats of unlawful conduct? 
How are we to distinguish violent ideologies—presumptively protected, as 
in the Klan’s white-ethnonationalist ambitions, however intrinsically 
genocidal—from intent, imminence, threats? These are profoundly 
challenging questions, and it will be a daunting task for legal scholars and 
practitioners. Using far-right and reactionary political actors as an example, 
the constellation of vocal leaders of reactionary “online subcultures,” 
including the range of “internet trolls, anti-feminist gamers, conspiracy 
 
 104. See Campbell supra note 66 and accompany discussion. 
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theorists, and ideologues, such as men’s rights activists and members of the 
so-called ‘alt-right,’” exposes known entities to light; these same 
subcultures, after all, have “relied on the power of celebrity,” not 
anonymity, so line-drawing questions are not patently unfeasible.105 Even 
aside from cases of radicalization through online media consumption are 
known and traceable,106 cases like the Proud Boys and Gavin McInnes107 
might be easier to distinguish: their speech expressly invokes violence, 
even if not imminently, as the overriding goal. The temporal distinction 
drawn by the Court in Brandenburg, much like its predication on a hair-
trigger understanding of anger’s temporality, cannot account for these real-
life and sometimes deadly cases. 
CLS and other progressive-left legal scholars typically have embraced 
extant, expansive First Amendment protections for reasons of principle and 
pragmatism alike. Giving the federal courts greater power to regulate the 
content of individuals’ beliefs or speech would expose already 
marginalized groups to the latent and overt biases of judges and Supreme 
Court justices just as surely as it could curb rhetoric propagating violent 
ideologies. Indeed, for that very reason, these concluding remarks do not 
call into question the “free speech principle” in general.108 After all, 
targeting the “mere advocacy” of the Klan’s ideology through a refinement 
of the 1960s-era Ohio criminal syndicalism statute could, in the hands of 
hostile authorities or equivocal courts, open up leftist radicals to censure to 
the extent their “advocacy” contemplates extralegal strategies of protest 
and action. With these manifold challenges and pragmatic uncertainties in 
clearer view, plus the concerns of potential backlash in mind, the need for 
considerable further examination of how anger’s framing in free speech 
claims is abundantly clear. 
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